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ABSTRACT 
 
Executives’ compensation has been on the forefront of the public and political debate since 
the recent financial crisis. One of the measures publicly discussed is a general upper 
boundary to top management compensation packages (“salary cap”, “maximum wage”). 
While such measures are novelties to the corporate world, the North American major sports 
leagues have been using maximum compensation regulations for decades. This paper 
exploits the 23-year experience with salary cap regulations from the National Football 
League (NFL). The results show a significant negative relation between the success of NFL 
teams and the amount of the net (after-tax) salary cap represented by the personal income 
tax rate of the teams’ home states. A team from California (highest average tax rate) wins 
2.256 games less per year and has an 11% reduced probability of making the playoffs than 
a team located in a no-tax state such as Florida or Texas. The paper contributes to and 
informs the ongoing public and political debate regarding the regulation of executive 
compensation, and its effects on the performance of the regulated entities. 
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1. Introduction 
Scientific research has shown that many companies try to attract the seemingly most talented 
individuals for directors and higher management positions by offering compensation packages (fixed 
salary and performance based bonuses) that appear to be far beyond the compensation levels of regular 
workers (see Frydman, and Jenter (2010); Krenn (2016)). For instance, in the U.S. the CEO-to-worker 
compensation increased from a ratio of 20-to-1 in 1965 to a ratio of 510.7-to-1 in 2013 with an 
average CEO pay of USD 24.8 million (Mishel, and Davis 2014). Similarly, in 2014 the average CEO 
pay disclosed by UK FTSE 100 firms was 125 times the average employee pay pointing to a mismatch 
regarding compensation levels (Krenn 2016). 
Recent developments of compensation practices of directors and top managers have not only 
stimulated academic research, but also opened an ongoing public debate about the level and 
composition of executive compensation. In a world of perceived growing inequality (Piketty 2014), 
this discussion has raised questions such as whether and how to regulate payments made by firms to 
their executives. It appears that in the last years many governments around the world have begun to 
show their response and started to directly or indirectly regulate management compensation.  
One of the discussed methods of regulating and reducing executive compensation is a mandatory 
upper boundary to executive compensations (“maximum wage”) (Brockway 1984; Ramsay 2005; 
Friedman 2008; Rowlingson, and Connor 2011; Blumkin, Sadka, and Shem-Tov 2013). The idea of 
using maximum wage rules however is not a new one. It reaches back to Aristotle (see Miller (2008)), 
who suggested that no one should have more than five times the wealth of the poorest person. During 
the second world-war, concerned by war profiteering, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a 
maximum income of USD 25,000 in 1942, accompanied by a 100% tax on all income above this level 
(Blumkin et al. 2013). Somewhat surprisingly, the literature has by and large overlooked binding 
maximum wage rules and their effects on the market for managerial labor as well as the subsequent 
effects on the regulated firms’ performance.  
This paper exploits the experience with salary cap regulations from the National Football League 
(NFL) to draw implications for the introduction of a mandatory upper boundary of employee 
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compensation on the affected firm’s performance. The NFL introduced a team wide salary cap in 1993 
(effective 1994) that limits the annual salaries paid in total to the players of a team to a predefined 
amount (in 2016: USD 155.27 million per team). To achieve a certain level of competitive balance 
between the teams, the NFL additionally regulates important aspects of the game such as the number 
of players a team can hire, the number and intensity of practice and training sessions, the general 
conditions of player-contract negotiations or the selection process of college players (“NFL draft”).1 
As the salary cap is a gross (pre-tax) amount, the different state personal income tax rates effectively 
institute individual salary caps for every team depending on its home state. The NFL thus provides an 
exceptional framework for studying competitive disadvantages imposed by different numerical limits 
to the compensation of highly mobile, highly skilled and highly specialized workforce without having 
to control or adjust for other socio-economic between subject variations (e.g. size, industry, 
profitability, regulatory framework, culture, etc.).  
Over the sample period, (1994-2016) the empirical analysis shows that teams located in high tax states 
are significantly less successful than low tax states’ teams. On average teams in high tax states win 0.2 
games per year less and have a 1% lower probability of making the playoffs per every percentage 
point of tax differential. For example, a team from California which has the highest average state 
personal income tax rate over the whole observation period wins 2.256 games (or 14.1% of the 16 
game season) less per year and has an 11% reduced probability of making the playoffs than a team 
located in a state without personal income tax such as Florida or Texas. The results are robust to 
various alternative tests, models and sub-samples.   
The results of this paper contribute in general to the accounting literature on executive compensation 
and specifically to its sub-stream focusing on compensation limits and mandatory compensation 
regulation. It is the first paper to empirically investigate the relation between regulatory imposed 
compensation limits and the affected legal entity’s performance and success. The paper also 
                                                      
1 See further the Collective Bargaining Agreement (August 4, 2011) between the NFL and the players union (“NFLPA”), 
available at  
https://www.google.at/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwi31_a_su_
SAhVJQZoKHQh0D7cQFggaMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fnfllabor.files.wordpress.com%2F2010%2F01%2Fcollective-
bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGKpuUA1kvqqsfwzOLq4HOhKGiJFA&sig2=aaMd22lAgpyI78Zp-
nMHTQ&bvm=bv.150729734,d.bGs (March 24, 2017). 
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contributes to and informs the ongoing public and political debate regarding the level of executive 
compensation and the perceived need for regulatory action. The results show that even within a 
sector/region that is highly insulated against emigration of workforce towards other sectors/regions the 
implementation of a regulatory compensation limit could have long-term effects on the labor market, 
the availability of compatible talent and subsequently the performance of the affected entities.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents relevant related literature. The 
theoretical background, which motivates the empirical analysis and develops the hypothesis, is 
presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the framework for the empirical analysis, results and 
robustness checks are presented in section 5; section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
The issue of salaries and especially CEO / director compensation and limits to it have been dealt with 
by the scientific literature quite extensively. There is a large stream of literature focusing on the 
relation between CEO / director compensation and business performance. Usually this literature 
investigates the impact of business performance on the compensation of directors, its amount and its 
composition (fixed salary vs performance based components). The first empirical studies on the 
relation between business performance on the compensation of directors were published during the 
1960s and 1970s (see McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962); Lewellen, and Huntsman (1970); Cosh 
(1975)). One of the main objectives of executive pay arrangements is the alignment of shareholder and 
executive interests (Jensen, and Murphy 1990; Bebchuk, and Fried 2003) and the reduction of agency 
problems (see for an overview Murphy (1999); Devers et al. (2007); Edmans, and Gabaix (2016); 
Barkema, and Gomez-Mejia (1998)).  
Already in the mid-1990s, a similar public debate as the current led to the introduction of a limited tax 
deductibility of certain parts of a CEO’s remuneration in the United States. Section 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (effective 1994) limited the corporate income tax deductibility of 
compensation paid to the CEO and the next four highest-paid executives to USD 1 million each (so-
called “Million-Dollar Cap”). The “Million-Dollar Cap” did not impose a general upper limit to 
5 
 
executive remuneration but introduced an indirect measure aimed at compelling corporations to refrain 
from higher salaries as it increased the cost of high salaries. Additionally, section 162(m) only 
included fixed salaries and excluded variable (performance based) components. While the theological 
aim was to reduce excessive executive remuneration, the analytical and the empirical literature showed 
an opposite trend. Hall, and Liebman (2000); Rose, and Wolfram (2000); Rose, and Wolfram (2002); 
Halperin, Kwon, and Rhoades-Catanach (2001); Balsam, and Ryan (1996); Balsam, and Qin (2005); 
Balsam, and Ryan (2007, 2008) and Göx (2008) show empirically or analytically that section 162(m) 
did not significantly limit the absolute amount of executive remuneration. The “Million-Dollar Cap” 
however changed the composition of the remuneration packages towards a higher importance of 
performance-based components.  
The recent financial crisis and the related bailout measures brought the public discussion on limiting 
executive compensation back. The general media and national governments not only discuss and 
implement indirect measures such as section 162(m) but also direct measures such as special personal 
income taxes on high salaries, maximum CEO-to-worker pay ratios and maximum wage laws for 
executives prohibiting remunerations that are perceived as too high. The research – especially 
empirical research – on such measures and their influence on CEO pay but also on the performance of 
the affected firm is very scarce. Krenn (2016) analyses theoretically the influence of (special) wage 
taxes on CEO remuneration on the hiring process of CEOs. He finds that when two companies 
compete for hiring the same individual to become their CEO the personal income tax rate of the CEO 
can alter the competition. Using an LEN model he shows that sufficiently large tax rate differentials 
can lead to a suboptimal allocation of CEO talent as the individual who is most compatible with one 
firm could end up being hired by the other firm.     
Dittmann, Maug, and Zhang (2011) discuss several restrictions on executive pay and analyze three 
types of restrictions: restrictions on ex post realized pay in order to avoid large payouts to executives 
across a range of possible scenarios (esp. “golden parachutes”, “golden handshakes”), restrictions on 
components of pay (fixed vs variable), and, finally, restrictions on the ex-ante value of pay 
(“maximum wage”). They show analytically, that after the implementation of a mandatory maximum 
compensation rate firms cannot provide the same level of incentives and cannot attract executives of 
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the same quality (talent, capability, effort, etc.) as before. Firms are thus not able to hire the most 
compatible executives anymore leading to frictions in the market for managerial labor. Dittmann et al. 
(2011) also estimate the average reduction in firm value when firms are forced to reduce the total CEO 
pay due to the maximum wage law at 0.07% per 20% pay reduction.  
Abudy, and Shust (2016) analyze the stock market’s reaction to the introduction of a maximum wage 
law in Israel in 2016. The Israeli “Executive Compensation in Financial Corporations Act” is a unique 
law as it specifies a mandatory upper limit to executive compensation of financial corporations. An 
annual executive compensation of more than 2.5 million New Israeli Shekel (approximately USD 
650,000) must not be granted if it is more than 35 times the lowest salary paid by the corporation. 
While the law became effective on Jan 1, 2017 Abudy et al. (2016) analyze the reaction of the Tel 
Aviv stock exchange to the final approval of the law in the Israeli parliament. In their event study, they 
find a statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal return on the trading day(s) following the 
law’s enactment suggesting that the enactment of the law had a positive influence on the value of the 
affected firms. While the Israeli “Executive Compensation in Financial Corporations Act” is an 
exceptional and very intriguing legal measure, the long-term effects of the law, its ramifications on the 
market for managerial labor and on the firms’ performances if less compatible individuals are hired, 
could not have been studied yet. Additionally, the limited scope of the law (banks, insurances, 
financial services, etc.) makes it difficult to generalize the findings of Abudy et al. (2016).  
 
3. Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis 
As shown, the literature – esp. the empirical literature – has not studied the long-term effects of the 
introduction of a mandatory compensation limit on the managerial labor market and on its 
ramifications on firm performance. The main reason for the scarce empirical results can be seen in the 
rarity of such legal measures being actually adopted. Transposing the results of the theoretical 
literature to the introduction of a mandatory maximum compensation one is inclined to expect it to be 
negatively related to the probability of hiring the most compatible individual as executive (Krenn 
2016) and subsequently the firm’s performance (Dittmann et al. 2011).    
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Building on the model of Dittmann et al. (2011), the analysis of the relation between maximum pay 
regulations and firm performance, uses a standard Cobb-Douglas production function assuming that 
the firm’s performance ! is influenced by the effort " and the level of talent # (i.e. the level of 
compatibility of the individual’s skills to the firm’s specific needs) of its employees; $ summarizes all 
other factors influencing ! (% and & are elasticities):  
! = 	$ ∗ "* ∗ #+ 
 
(1) 
The employees are effort-averse, so that the owner of the firm compensates the employees for the cost 
of effort ,-(") and for their talent level 0-(#). Both, the cost of effort and the cost of talent are 
assumed to have isoelastic supply functions (Dittmann et al. 2011) that relate the costs 
(=compensation) to the level of effort and talent respectively (1 and 2 are elasticities): 
,- " = "3 
 
(2) 
0- # = #4  
 
(3) 
The compensation (Π) of any employee thus depends on the effort provided to the firm and on the 
individual talent level: 
Π = 	,- " + 0-(#) 
 
(4) 
Under the legal constraint of a maximum wage (Π with Π ≤ Π) the compensation (for all Π > Π) 
changes to:  
Π = 	,- " + 0-(#) 
 
(5) 
Under the assumption of effort-averse employees a reduced compensation (Π) would lead to a reduced 
level of effort ("(Π) with "(Π) < "). Alternatively, assuming sufficiently mobile employees that could 
either physically relocate out of the geographical scope of the maximum wage or change the industry 
if the maximum wage is not applicable to the whole economy, the maximum wage could lead to a 
reduction in available compatible talent (#(Π) with #(Π) < #). In both instances, the introduction of a 
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maximum wage could have negative effects on the firm’s performance (! with ! < !) due to the 
relation between firm performance (!) and effort ("(Π)) and talent (#(Π)): 
! = 	$ ∗ "(Π)* ∗ #(Π)+ 
 
(6) 
Based on this brief theoretical analysis of the influence of a mandatory maximum wage on the affected 
firm’s performance the hypothesis for the following empirical analysis reads as follows: 
Hyp: A mandatory maximum wage leads to a reduced performance of the affected firms. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Investigation Strategy 
The empirical analysis exploits data from the NFL. The NFL as one of the four major North American 
sports leagues introduced a salary cap for every 32 teams in 1994. The salary cap2 establishes a 
maximum total amount that every team can spend on its 53 players per year. Because of the tax rate 
differences in state personal income taxes the NFL serves as an ideal framework to investigate the 
influence of a maximum wage in a setting where workforce is highly mobile, highly skilled and highly 
specialized. As all teams are subject to the salary cap, they all have to comply with the same rules with 
respect to player contract negotiations and contractual terms. All teams are similar in size and activity; 
the number of players each team can add to its active roster (53 players) is regulated as is the number 
of games each team plays and even the number of training and practice sessions is regulated by the 
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the players’ union (“NFLPA”). Therefore, it is 
a setting where the variation between the subjects is very small compared to regular cross-sectional or 
international empirical studies that require extensive adjusting and controlling for differences in size, 
profitability, activity, ownership, culture, etc.  
                                                      
2  The salary cap of the NFL is regularly referred to as “hard cap” (Krautmann, and Solow 2012; Leeds, and Kowalewski 
2001; Borghesi 2008; Nissim 2004). A hard cap is an absolute maximum amount that a team can spend over the course of 
each season with no exceptions while a “soft cap” would allow for crediting an overspending against the following year’s 
salary cap (Nissim 2004). The NFL has to approve all contracts between a team and a player to become effective; 
therefore, the salary cap cannot be exceeded. 
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The main variation between the subjects originates from the applicable personal income tax rate of the 
home state of the team. All states with a personal income tax reserve the right to tax any resident and 
non-resident on professional income earned in the state. This policy applies to any non-resident, but it 
is typically applied mainly to high-profile and high-income professional athletes (so called “jock tax”) 
like NFL players (Alm, Kaempfer, and Batte Sennoga 2012). The commonly used allocation method 
is based on “duty days”. Duty days represent the number of days that the player spends in providing 
professional services in a state. The total salary of the player is then allocated across states in which he 
plays in accordance to the proportion of the total duty days spent in each state (DiMascio 2006; 
Ekmekjian 1994; Ekmekjian, Wilkerson, and Bing 2011; Farnsworth 2013; Nolan 2016). Usually, the 
total number of a NFL player’s annual duty days (pre-season and regular season practices, home 
games and away games, playoffs) is assumed to be around 200 (Pogroszewski 2008; Zelinsky 2015). 
Away games usually count as two duty days as teams travel to the location of the away game one day 
in advance and leave right after the game. In total, this amounts to 16 duty days out of the home state 
(8%-10% of total duty days) per season. The personal income tax rate of the home state is therefore 
the most important factor determining the tax burden of any NFL player as 90% of the player’s salary 
is taxable in that state.  
Taking the differences in the state personal income tax rates into account, every team has an individual 
after-tax salary cap. The annual salary cap figure is adjusted at the beginning of the league year and 
depends on the overall revenue of the whole league. The first salary cap in 1994 was set at USD 
34.608 million and increased steadily by around 8.1% per year with the salary cap of the 2016 season 
being USD 155.27 million. Thus, in 2016 every NFL team is allowed to pay every of its 53 players on 
average an annual (pre-tax) salary of USD 2,929,622.64.  
The aim of the salary cap is to ensure competitive balance between all 32 teams. Competitive balance 
within a sports league is important for the overall attractiveness of the league and its games to fans and 
the media. The uncertainty of the outcome of a particular game is critical to spectator interest, which 
relates to media attention and commercial success of the whole league (Rosen, and Sanderson 2001). 
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It is thus in the overarching interest of the owners of the sports teams to ensure a certain level of 
competitive balance among all participating teams (Rosen et al. 2001; Mondello, and Maxcy 2009).3  
The 32 NFL teams are located in 22 different states with (in 2016) 19 different tax rates. Seven teams 
are located in states with no personal income tax (Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington); four 
teams are located in California with the highest personal income tax rate of 14.10%. The average state 
personal income tax rate of all 32 teams in 2016 is 5.44% (median: 5.00%).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides an overview of personal state income tax rates of all 32 NFL teams in 2016. The 
table splits the teams between playoff teams and non-playoff teams. The difference in the average tax 
rates of playoff teams (4.62%) and non-playoff teams (5.93%), which amounts to 1.31 percentage 
points or 28.28% of the playoff teams’ average tax rate, provides some intuition that the tax rate 
differences leads to competitive advantages and disadvantages.  
After state personal income taxes (without accounting for federal income taxes and other charges), 
every playoff team can spend on average USD 2,794,274.08 for every of the 53 players and the non-
playoff teams can spend on average USD 2,755,896.02, which is a difference of USD 38,378.06 per 
player per season. When focusing on the highest (California – 14.10%) and the lowest (Florida, 
Tennessee, Texas and Washington – 0.00%) personal income tax rates, the difference in average per 
player (after tax) spending amounts to USD 413,076.79 per season.  
The different after-tax salary caps are similar to maximum wage regulations that set the threshold at 
different levels. A team located in a low tax state (e.g. Florida) has the possibility to pay higher (after 
tax) maximum wages than a team located in a high tax state (e.g. California) (Π:;<=>? > Π@ABC=>?). 
For a player who is geographically mobile and able to choose where to play (undrafted and/or 
unrestricted free agents) that difference might be an incentive to play for teams in lower tax rate states. 
Teams with a lower after tax salary cap (high tax state) would be able to hire either less talented 
                                                      
3  There is wide agreement in the literature that salary caps can indeed mitigate competitive imbalances in sports leagues 
because they prevent wealthy clubs with high market potential from bidding the full marginal value for additional talent 
(Fort, and Quirk 1995; Fort 2012; Rosen et al. 2001; Dietl, Duschl, and Lang 2011; Lee 2010). This effect allows less 
wealthy clubs to retain star players. 
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players (#(Π)	@ABC=>? < #(Π)	:;<=>?) or players providing less effort ("(Π)	@ABC=>? < "(Π)	:;<=>?). 
In both instances, the team with the lower salary cap (high tax state) could end up with a less 
competitive team, a lower level of team performance  
(!@DBC=>? = 	$ ∗ " Π *@ABC=>? ∗ # Π +@ABC=>? < !:;<=>? = 	$ ∗ "(Π)*:;<=>? ∗ #(Π)+:;<=>?)  
and therefore have fewer success in terms of wins and playoff appearances.  
 
4.2. Model and Variables  
To test that hypothesis, I collect performance data (wins, playoff appearances) of all NFL teams over 
the time-span 1994-2016. The estimation strategy is twofold: First, I estimate a within-group model 
that exploits the panel nature of the data and controls for team fixed and time effects. The dependent 
variable in this estimation is the number of wins (Wins). The explanatory variable of main interest is 
the state personal income tax rate (StateTax) of the team’s respective home state during the regular 
season. 
EFGHA,J = 	KL#M#"0MNA,J + %OA,J + PA + QJ + RAJ 
 
(7) 
OA,J is a vector of control variables, PA are team-fixed and QJ are time fixed effects. The fixed-effects 
model seems appropriate for the analysis for two reasons. First, much of the variation in wins is 
between the teams rather than within the same team over time. Although it would be difficult to 
specify all the characteristics that determine the differences across teams, one can capture permanent 
differences between teams with team fixed effects. Similarly, there are many factors that may affect 
team wins over time, and I capture those differences with annual time effects. Second, the fixed-
effects model is a within-group estimator that uses a weighted average of the within-team and the 
across-team variation to form the parameter estimates. Therefore, the estimate of the effects of state 
income tax variations measures how team wins change within panels of teams due to the presence or 
absence of a state income tax.  
12 
 
Second, I estimate a probit regression model with the dependent variable being Playoff indicating 
whether a team made the playoffs (Playoff=1) or not (Playoff=0): 
STMUVWWA,J = 	KL#M#"0MNA,J + %OA,J + PA + QJ + RAJ 
 
(8) 
Additionally, both models in equations (7) and (8) are estimated with an alternative tax rate measure: 
TaxDiff. TaxDiff measures the difference between the individually applicable tax rate and the average 
tax rate of all teams in the respective season. It thus represents the competitive advantage 
(disadvantage) of teams located in low tax (high tax) states. 
EFGHA,J = 	K0MNXFWWA,J + %OA,J + PA + QJ + RAJ 
 
(7a) 
STMUVWWA,J = 	K0MNXFWWA,J + %OA,J + PA + QJ + RAJ 
 
(8a) 
With respect to the control variables (OA,J) I follow previous literature by including a number of 
variables that influence the success/performance of a football team. Previous literature and the general 
media have repeatedly focused on the importance of two distinct positions/functions in a football team 
and their influence on team success: the quarterback and the head coach.  
The quarterback is the premier position on the team. Usually, he is responsible for delivering the ball 
to the appropriate teammate in hopes of advancing it. The majority of previous research on this topic 
focuses on the quality of defense and the quality of the individual opposing quarterback. The phrase 
“offense wins games, defense wins championships” is coined by coaches, players, and analysts. The 
study by Robst et al. (2011) finds no evidence that improving the defense leads to more team success. 
However, according to a study by Moskowitz, and Wertheim (2012) who investigated 427 playoff 
games between 1967 and 2012, the strength of the offense is more important. Out of these games, the 
higher ranked offensive team has won 62% while the higher ranked defensive team won 58% of the 
time.4  
                                                      
4  The total exceeds 100% because sometimes the winning team is ranked higher in both offense and defense in comparison 
to its given opponent. 
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With respect to the quarterback, previous research has shown that the two factors stability and 
experience are highly important and are positively related to team success. Wittke (2012) shows a 
significant negative relation between the number of starting quarterbacks (quarterbacks that start the 
game) per season and winning percentage of all NFL teams over a ten-year period (2002-2011). 
Employing more than one starting quarterbacks means that either the player designated as starting 
quarterback after training camp and pre-season games got injured or performed poorly during the 
season. In both instances, the team’s chances of winning games reduces dramatically. This finding by 
previous research is included as the control variable QBstart, which is the number of individuals 
starting a game at the quarterback position during the season. Regarding experience Wittke (2012), 
Leeds et al. (2001) and Simmons, and Berri (2009) show that teams that employ a quarterback with 
more years of experience have a significantly higher chance of winning more games. The control 
variable QBexp, which is the number of years of experience of the quarterback who starts the majority 
of the games during the season, incorporates this finding in the study.  
While the position of the quarterback is of outmost importance for the success of any football team, 
using the quarterback as a control variable introduces some endogeneity to the model. As one of the 53 
players on the active roster of an NFL, team the quarterback’s salary counts against the team’s salary 
cap. However, prior research and public media suggests that quarterbacks are relatively unaffected by 
the compensation restriction put in place by the salary cap (Leeds et al. 2001; Borghesi 2008). Starting 
quarterbacks regularly are the highest paid players on any team and account for around 10%-15% of a 
team’s salary cap5. Additionally, top quarterbacks only very rarely become free agents, change teams 
and negotiate salaries with different teams.6 Using the importance of the quarterback position for the 
success of the team as control variables therefore outweighs the risk of endogeneity; however, as a 
robustness check the models are estimated without using the quarterback variables (see section 4.4.2 
below) 
                                                      
5  See www.spotrac.com (March 27, 2017). 
6  See as one of these very rare occasion Peyton Manning, one of the statistically best quarterbacks in NFL history became a 
free agent in 2012. He left his previous team (Indianapolis Colts where he played for 14 seasons) to play for the Denver 
Broncos. His salary in the last season with Indianapolis: USD 16,000,000 (13.33% of the salary cap); his salary in his 
first season with Denver: USD 18,000,000 (14.93% of the salary cap).  
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With respect to the head coach prior research also shows that stability and experience are significantly 
important for team success. The findings of Hadley et al. (2000) and Wittke (2012) suggest basically 
the same pattern as with quarterbacks. More experienced head coaches have significantly more 
success measured as wins per season. Hadley et al. (2000) find that more experienced coaches are 
more efficient, implying that coaching experience contributes positively to a team’s number of wins 
during the regular season. They conclude that a more experienced head coach can contribute up to four 
additional wins to his team in a given season. The control variable CoachExp, which is the number of 
years of experience the head coach had at the beginning of the season, incorporates this finding into 
the model. Similar to the quarterback, change at the position of head coach is significantly related to 
fewer team wins in the year of the coaching change. The variable CoachChange (an indicator variable 
that takes on the value 1 if the team changed the head coach during the year - before and during the 
season) accounts for that. 
The control variables further consist of team specific variables that influence the overall success of the 
team. Division is an indicator variable indicating the division of the team. The NFL is divided into two 
conferences and each conference is divided into four divisions. The division/conference of the team 
decides the opponents the team faces during the season. Every team plays six games against the other 
three teams of the division, six games against other teams of the same conference and four games 
against teams from the other conference. Therefore the competitive strength of the own division 
(37.5% of games) and the strength of the own conference (75% of games) strongly influences the 
chances of winning games.7  
With LagWins (number of wins in the previous season) and 5yearWins (number of wins in previous 
five seasons) as well as LagPlayoff (indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the team had made 
the playoffs in the previous season and 0 otherwise) and 5yearPlayoff (number of playoff appearances 
                                                      
7  Note that the NFL realigned the divisions after the 2001 season to its current alignment (2x4 divisions with 4 teams 
each). Prior to that the NFL was aligned in two conferences with three divisions and each division had 5 teams (except 
for AFC Central having 6 teams). While the realignment changed the playing schedule to its current format, the previous 
scheduling format also put the emphasis on inter-division and inter-conference games. 
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in previous five seasons) the previous success of the team is incorporated into the model (see Pitts 
(2016)). See Table 2 for an overview of the variables used in the models.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.3. Data 
As briefly addressed above, the empirical analysis is based on performance data (wins, playoff 
appearances) of all NFL teams over the time-span 1994-2016 (23 NFL seasons with 721 team-year 
observations). As every team plays 16 regular season games the 721 team-year observations are based 
on 11,536 regular season games. The data forms an unbalanced panel as four teams (so called 
expansion teams) in the sample did not play in all 23 NFL seasons of the sample period (the teams 
Carolina Panthers, Jacksonville Jaguars started to play in 1995; Cleveland Browns relocated after the 
1995 season to Baltimore to become the Baltimore Ravens and was re-established as a new team in 
1999; Houston Texans started to play in 2002). Table 3 provides a first overview of the teams, their 
success and the average state personal income tax rate of their respective home state.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Average Tax Rate is the average statutory personal income tax rate of the respective home state over 
the whole observation period. Since several teams have relocated or have started playing at some point 
during the sample period,8 the average tax rate differs several times within the same state.9 The data is 
very homogeneous and the degree of skewness is very small. The average of the average tax rates is 
4.97% (median: 5.44%) with the minimum at 0.00% and the maximum at 11.28%.  
The average wins per season per team is 7.97 (median: 7.86) with the minimum at 4.89 and the 
maximum at 11.09. The total winning percentage has an average of 0.498 (median: 0.491)10 with the 
                                                      
8  Carolina Panthers, Cleveland Browns, Houston Texans, Jacksonville Jaguars were expansion teams; Baltimore Ravens, 
Tennessee Titans and Los Angeles Rams relocated.  
9  See California, Maryland, Ohio. 
10  The average (median) winning percentage is not 0.5 because of the unbalanced nature of the panel due to the expansion 
teams (Carolina Panthers, Cleveland Browns, Houston Texans, Jacksonville Jaguars); when excluding these teams the 
average and the median is 0.5.   
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minimum at 0.306 and the maximum at 0.693. On average teams have 8.63 playoff appearances 
(median: 7.50) and 0.72 Super Bowl titles. The most successful team over the whole observation 
period is New England Patriots (winning percentage of 0.693, 18 playoff appearances and 5 Super 
Bowl titles). The least successful team on the other hand is Cleveland Browns (winning percentage of 
0.306, one playoff appearance and no Super Bowl titles).  
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on an observation-by-observation basis (721 team-years). The 
variable Wins is equally distributed. The average wins per team is 8 (median: 8) with the maximum of 
1611 and the minimum of 012. The variable Playoff is moderately skewed which is due to the limited 
number of playoff spots per year (12 out of 32 teams can make the playoffs every year). StateTax (the 
statutory personal income tax rate of the team’s home state) has an average (median) of 5.014 (5.150) 
with the minimum (maximum) at 0.00%13 (14.10%14). TaxDiff representing the difference between the 
applicable state personal income tax and the average of all teams’ state personal income tax rates in a 
respective season has an average of 0.00 (median: 0.146). The minimum is -5.337 and the maximum is 
8.913.  
On average teams have 1.688 (median: 2) quarterbacks starting a game (QBstart) per season with the 
maximum being 4 (in 14 team-year observations). The main starting quarterbacks have an average 
experience (QBexp) of 5.535 (median: 5) years, the maximum is 20 and in 51 team-year observations 
rookies were the main starting quarterbacks (QBexp = 0). The experience of the head coach 
(CoachExp) is similarly distributed (average: 5.463, median: 5.225, maximum: 32 years, minimum: 0 
years) and teams change their head coach (CoachChange) 0.227 times per year (164 total coaching 
changes over the 23 year observation period). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                      
11  New England Patriots in 2007. 
12  Detroit Lions in 2008. 
13  Florida, Tennessee, Texas, Washington (throughout the whole observation period).  
14  California (2012-2016). 
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5. Results 
5.1 Main Analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of the primary analysis. It is a fixed-effects panel regression over the whole 
period 1994-2016 with Wins as the dependent variable. The table includes six different specifications. 
Specifications (1)-(3) use StateTax and specifications (4)-(6) use TaxDiff as main variable of interest. 
Specifications (2) and (5) include the number of wins of the previous season (LagWins) to control for 
the general competitiveness of the team while specifications (3) and (6) use the average number of 
wins over the last five seasons (5yearWins) as an indicator of the long-term success of the team.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Specifications (1)-(3) report statistically significant relations between a team’s home state’s personal 
income tax rate and the team’s number of wins. In all three specifications, StateTax has a significant 
negative coefficient between -0.2042 and -0.2533. The results therefore show that a team located in a 
state with a one-percentage point higher tax rate than a second team wins on average 0.2 games less 
per season. For example, teams located in California (highest tax rate) over the whole observation 
period win 2.256 games per year (or 14.1% of the 16 games season) less than teams located in Florida, 
Tennessee, Texas, or Washington (no personal income tax). Specifications (1)-(3) also provide 
evidence that the number of wins during the last season (LagWins) is a significant indicator of future 
success, however only over the short-run as 5yearWins is not significant.  
Specifications (4)-(6) confirm these findings while using an alternative tax measure. TaxDiff measures 
the difference between the individually applicable tax rate and the average tax rate of all teams in the 
respective season. It thus represents the competitive advantage (disadvantage) of teams located in low 
tax (high tax) states. The results are very similar to the results of specifications (1)-(3). TaxDiff has 
throughout all specifications a statistically significant negative coefficient. Teams located in relatively 
high tax states (states with tax rates above the annual average) win on average 0.2 fewer games per 
season per percentage point difference to the average than teams located in low tax states. TaxDiff’s 
maximum (minimum) thus relates to 1.85 fewer (1.11 more) wins per season than the average tax rate. 
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Again, the previous season’s number of wins (LagWins) is a significant indicator of future success, 
while the coefficient of 5yearWins is not significant. 
Additionally to the estimations reported in Table 5, which use the number of regular season Wins as a 
performance measure of the teams, Table 6 shows the results of a series of estimations that focus on 
the chances of making the playoffs. The dependent variable (Playoff) is a binary variable taking on the 
value 1 if a team qualifies for the playoffs in the respective year (and 0 otherwise). Qualifying for the 
playoffs is closely related to the number of wins, however because of the playoff seeding process of 
the NFL the twelve teams with the best regular season record are not guaranteed a playoff spot. The 
winners of the eight divisions and the other two best teams of either conference make the playoffs. 
Playoff seeding is thus also depending on the overall strength of the division. A team without having 
one of the six best win-loss-records in a conference can still make the playoffs if it wins its division.15 
Usually ten or more wins16 in a season secure a playoff spot (see also Hadley et al. (2000)). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Specifications (1)-(3) use StateTax as tax measure while specifications (4)-(6) employ TaxDiff. The 
results are similar to Table 5 however the statistical significance of the results is different. These 
differences are attributable to the specific playoff seeding procedure of the NFL, which is not 
exclusively dependent on a team’s number of wins. All specifications find a negative relation between 
the applied tax measure (StateTax; TaxDiff) and the chances of making the playoffs. An increase in 
StateTax by 1 percentage point (marginal effects) relates to a 0.01 reduction in the chances of making 
the playoffs. A team located in California over the whole observation period has therefore an 11% 
reduced chance of making the playoffs than teams located in Florida, Tennessee, Texas, or 
Washington.  
The main analysis reported in Tables 5 and 6 show a statistically significant negative relation between 
the personal income tax rate of a team’s home state and that team’s level of success. This relation is 
                                                      
15  See for example NFC Playoffs in 2010: Seattle Seahawks win the division with a 7:9 win-loss-record (qualifying for the 
playoffs) which was the eight best record and New York Giants with a 10:6 win-loss-record did not make the playoffs 
(second in the division and out of the top two non-division-winners).  
16  Only eleven teams in the sample did not make the playoffs when winning 10 games, yet 60 teams made the playoffs with 
less than ten wins. 
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consistent throughout almost all specifications irrespective of the employed tax variable and 
irrespective of the success measure used. The results support the hypothesis developed above that 
teams, which are located in high tax states and have thus a smaller net salary cap and are thus 
financially more limited, perform on average at a lower level than teams located in low tax states.    
 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
The analysis reported in Table 5 estimates a fixed-effects model. While, as addressed above, the fixed-
effects model seems appropriate for the analysis, I also estimate the same specifications with a random 
effects model – see Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results are largely unaffected: the coefficients of the tax variables have the same sign and similar 
significance levels. However, the Hausman (1978) specification test (not tabulated) indicates that the 
fixed-effects model is a better fit than the random effects model.   
Table 8 and Table 9 report results of additional robustness checks that use various sub-samples of the 
main sample. Table 8 employs StateTax as tax measure and Table 9 uses TaxDiff. Specifications (1)-
(3) of both tables focus on the unbalanced nature of the main sample. The main sample includes all 
teams that are active in 2016; however, four of these teams did not play during the whole sample 
period. Newly established teams (so-called “expansion teams”) are regularly not as competitive as 
existing teams. The expansion teams record on average 6.71 wins per season (compared to 7.97 
average wins per season for the whole sample). To check whether the results of the primary analysis 
are distorted by the expansion teams, observations of these teams are removed from the sample in 
specifications (1)-(3) of Table 8 and Table 9 but the results remain unchanged.  
Specifications (4)-(12) of Table 8 and Table 9 remove the historically best team (New England 
Patriots – specifications (4)-(6)), the historically worst team (Cleveland Browns – specifications (7)-
(9)) and both, the best and the worst teams (specifications (10)-(12)). The models remain the same as 
in the analysis reported in Table 5. Again, the results remain largely unchanged. The statutory personal 
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income tax rate of the home state of the team has a statistically significant negative relation to the 
respective teams performance measured in wins (Table 8).  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
And, the difference between the home state’s personal income tax rate and the average personal 
income tax rate of all teams during the respective season (TaxDiff) (Table 9) is negatively related to a 
given team’s performance (wins per season) and the relation is throughout almost all specifications 
statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The relations reported in the primary analysis might be skewed by observations of teams that are 
located in states that do not apply a personal income tax at all. Four states in the sample do not apply 
such a tax (Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington) and seven NFL teams17 are located in these 
states. These teams have a strong competitive advantage compared to the average tax rate (6.36 %) of 
teams located in states that levy a personal income tax. The estimations reported in Table 10 remove 
observations of these seven teams. The results (sign and significance level) are very similar to the 
results reported in Table 5. The effect size however is bigger throughout all specifications, which can 
be explained by the fact that two of the four expansion teams18, which are not as competitive and 
successful as the pre-existing teams, are located in the no-tax states. Thus 28.6% of no-tax states teams 
are expansion teams, while 8% of the other teams are expansion teams. The average wins of no-tax 
state teams is therefore downward skewed (average wins of no-tax state teams including expansion 
teams is 7.80 and without expansion teams: 8.10) which explains the bigger effect size.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Two of the control variables (QBstart and QBexp) represent the importance of the quarterback to the 
team’s success. The quarterback’s salary however is as every other player’s salary on the 53-man 
roster subject to the salary cap restrictions. Including these control variables introduces a level of 
                                                      
17  Florida: Jacksonville Jaguars, Miami Dolphins, Tampa Bay Buccaneers; Tennessee: Tennessee Titans; Texas: Dallas 
Cowboys, Houston Texans; Washington: Seattle Seahawks. 
18  Jacksonville Jaguars (Florida); Houston Texans (Texas). 
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endogeneity to the model that could distort the results of the estimations. Therefore, the robustness 
check reported in Table 11 excludes ceteris paribus the quarterback variables from the model. The 
results remain unchanged. But, comparing the R-Squared values of the estimations reported in Table 
11 to those of Table 5 provides further evidence for the importance of the quarterback and underpins 
the necessity of using these control variables in the primary analysis.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
The results show a significant negative relation between the success (performance) of NFL teams and 
the amount of the net (after-tax) salary cap represented by the personal income tax rate of the teams’ 
home states. Teams that have a stronger regulatory salary restriction are thus less successful than 
teams with higher regulatory payout allowances. This relation could be explained according to the 
theoretical analysis in section 3 by the reduced possibility to hire players that either provide the 
necessary effort level or that possess the necessary talent level.  
When interpreting the empirical results and drawing implications for the corporate setting several 
aspects need to be considered as the professional team sports industry differs from traditional business 
sectors in a number of ways. First, there is a difference in professional sports between athletic and 
economic competition (Fort et al. 1995; Szymanski 2003; Dietl et al. 2011). While from an athletic 
perspective opposing teams are competitors, they are complementors from an economic perspective. A 
single team cannot produce a marketable product. It needs at least one opponent. Fans prefer to attend 
matches with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races. Unlike enterprises such as 
Google, Apple or Microsoft, which benefit from weak competitors in their respective industries, the 
professional sports teams need strong competitors to maximize their revenues. Therefore, NFL teams 
maintain self-imposed restrictions. This self-regulation is effective because the NFL focusses on a 
small, homogeneous geographic region and team composition within the league is very stable. 
Competition from outside the NFL is very weak and almost non-existing.   
Because of the non-existence of serious outside competition, the NFL is in a unique position with 
respect to employment opportunities for star athletes. No American football league outside the NFL 
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can compete with the league financially and with respect to public attention. Consequently, star 
players do not have significant outside options. Tom Brady of the New England Patriots cannot simply 
leave the NFL and join another league without suffering major income losses. Teams outside the NFL 
simply cannot offer the same level of compensation.19 Professional athletes thus show lower salary 
elasticity than executives, and a decrease in salary does not necessarily lead to immediate exit to a 
foreign league. In contrast, an executive could easily escape compensation regulation by starting to 
work for a company, which is not regulated (either in a different location or in a different industry). 
Therefore, the negative relation between payment restrictions and performance of the regulated entity 
would be even stronger in settings where income elasticities are stronger and competition from outside 
the regulated industry sector and/or geographical region is more profound.  
Despite the differences between the NFL and the corporate sector, corporations can learn from the 
experience of NFL teams. To mitigate the effects of external regulation, self-regulation of sectors 
analogous to the practice in the NFL could be an alternative to government intervention. Self-
regulation by sectors, for example the banking sector, is already common practice. An extension of 
self-regulation to executive compensation could reduce the necessity of extensive government 
intervention. However, self-regulation initiatives for corporate governance by the European Union 
have shown that they can be successful only if mandatory compliance, monitoring and enforcement 
accompany the initiatives (De Jong et al. 2005). Although coordination of business sectors or whole 
economies is much more complicated than in professional sports leagues, regulators have undertaken 
various coordination efforts in the recent past. The 2009 G 20 summit,20 which had salary caps for 
executive compensation on its agenda, is one example of concerted effort to avoid executive migration 
away from regulated economies. By including the world’s major economies, the chance of executives 
escaping the regulation could be reduced, which would mitigate the negative effects of compensation 
limits on the regulated entities’ performance.  
  
                                                      
19  According to Forbes.com (https://www.forbes.com/profile/tom-brady/ (March 27, 2017)) Tom Brady earned USD 44 
million in 2016, of which USD 29 million were salaries paid by his team.  
20  See http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html (March 27, 2017). 
23 
 
Table 1 – State Personal Income Tax Rates (2016) 
Table 1 reports state personal income taxes for every NFL team for 2016 comparing teams that made the playoffs (playoff 
teams) and teams that did not make the playoffs (non-playoff teams).  
Playoff-Teams State Tax Rate   Non-Playoff-Teams State Tax Rate 
Miami Dolphins FL 0.00%   Buffalo Bills NY 6.89% 
New England Patriots MA 5.15%   New York Jets NJ 8.97% 
Pittsburgh Steelers PA 3.07%   Baltimore Ravens MD 5.83% 
Houston Texans TX 0.00%   Cincinnati Bengals OH 5.00% 
Kansas City Chiefs MO 6.08%   Cleveland Browns OH 5.00% 
Oakland Raiders CA 14.10%   Indianapolis Colts IN 3.30% 
Dallas Cowboys TX 0.00%   Jacksonville Jaguars FL 0.00% 
New York Giants NJ 8.97%   Tennessee Titans TN 0.00% 
Detroit Lions MI 4.25%   Denver Broncos CO 4.77% 
Green Bay Packers WI 7.65%   San Diego Chargers CA 14.10% 
Atlanta Falcons GA 6.18%   Philadelphia Eagles PA 3.07% 
Seattle Seahawks WA 0.00%   Washington Redskins MD 5.83% 
     Chicago Bears IL 3.75% 
     Minnesota Vikings MN 10.15% 
     Carolina Panthers NC 5.75% 
     New Orleans Saints LA 3.60% 
     Tampa Bay Buccaneers FL 0.00% 
     Arizona Cardinals AZ 4.34% 
     Los Angeles Rams CA 14.10% 
     San Francisco 49ers CA 14.10% 
Average  4.62%   Average  5.93% 
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Table 2 – Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
StateTax State personal income tax rate of the home state of the respective team NBER 
TaxDiff Difference between applicable state personal income tax and the average of all teams’ state personal income tax rates in a respective season. NBER (own calculation) 
Wins Number of wins (with a tie being counted as 0.5 win) www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
LagWins Number of wins in the previous season (with a tie being counted as 0.5 win) www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
5yearWins Number of wins in the previous five season (with a tie being counted as 0.5 win) 
www.pro-football-
reference.com/ 
Playoff Indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the team makes the playoffs and 0 otherwise 
www.pro-football-
reference.com/ 
LagPlayoff Indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the team had made the playoffs in the previous season and 0 otherwise 
www.pro-football-
reference.com/ 
5yearPlayoff Number of playoff appearances in the previous five season www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
QBstart Number of Quarterbacks starting a game during the season  www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
QBexp Years of experience of the Quarterback who starts the majority of games during the season  
www.pro-football-
reference.com/ 
CoachChange Indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the team changed the head coach during the year (before and during the season) 
www.pro-football-
reference.com/ 
CoachExp  Years of experience of the head coach  www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
Division Indicator variable of the division of the team www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
 
  
25 
 
Table 3 – NFL Teams (1994-2016) 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on every NFL team during the observation period (1994-2016). “Wins” include all wins 
in a regular season game with a tie being counted as 0.5 wins. “Playoffs” counts the number of overall playoff appearances per 
team. Average Tax Rate is the average of the state personal income tax applicable in the respective year. The teams “Carolina 
Panthers”, “Jacksonville Jaguars”, “Cleveland Browns” and “Houston Texans” were newly established, the teams “Baltimore 
Ravens”, “Los Angeles Rams”, “Tennessee Titans” relocated during the observation period.   
Team State 
Average 
Tax 
Rate 
Games 
(Total) 
Wins 
(Total) 
Average 
Wins 
(season) 
Winning 
Percentage 
(Total) 
Playoffs Super  Bowl 
Super 
Bowl 
(Wins) 
Sample 
Period 
Arizona Cardinals AZ 4.80 368 159.5 6.93 0.433 5 1 0 1994-2016 
Atlanta Falcons GA 6.14 368 185.5 8.07 0.504 9 2 0 1994-2016 
Baltimore Ravens MD 5.56 368 197.5 8.59 0.537 11 2 2 1994-2016 
Buffalo Bills NY 7.36 368 166 7.22 0.451 4 0 0 1994-2016 
Carolina Panthers NC 7.80 352 172.5 7.84 0.490 7 2 0 1995-2016 
Chicago Bears IL 3.41 368 171 7.43 0.465 5 1 0 1994-2016 
Cincinnati Bengals OH 6.62 368 163.5 7.11 0.444 7 0 0 1994-2016 
Cleveland Browns OH 6.45 288 88 4.89 0.306 1 0 0 1999-2016 
Dallas Cowboys TX 0.00 368 199 8.65 0.541 11 1 1 1994-2016 
Denver Broncos CO 4.83 368 224 9.74 0.609 13 4 3 1994-2016 
Detroit Lions MI 4.24 368 142 6.17 0.386 7 0 0 1994-2016 
Green Bay Packers WI 7.11 368 236.5 10.28 0.643 18 3 2 1994-2016 
Houston Texans TX 0.00 240 106 7.07 0.442 4 0 0 2002-2016 
Indianapolis Colts IN 3.39 368 221 9.61 0.601 16 2 1 1994-2016 
Jacksonville Jaguars FL 0.00 352 155 7.05 0.440 6 0 0 1995-2016 
Kansas City Chiefs MO 6.04 368 192 8.35 0.522 9 0 0 1994-2016 
Los Angeles Rams CA 6.38 368 159.5 6.93 0.433 5 2 1 1994-2016 
Miami Dolphins FL 0.00 368 186 8.09 0.505 9 0 0 1994-2016 
Minnesota Vikings MN 8.58 368 195.5 8.50 0.531 11 0 0 1994-2016 
New England Patriots MA 5.48 368 255 11.09 0.693 18 8 5 1994-2016 
New Orleans Saints LA 3.71 368 178 7.74 0.484 6 1 1 1994-2016 
New York Giants NJ 7.94 368 191.5 8.33 0.520 9 3 2 1994-2016 
New York Jets NJ 7.94 368 171 7.43 0.465 7 0 0 1994-2016 
Oakland Raiders CA 11.28 368 152 6.61 0.413 4 1 0 1994-2016 
Philadelphia Eagles PA 2.95 368 201 8.74 0.546 12 1 0 1994-2016 
Pittsburgh Steelers PA 2.95 368 232.5 10.11 0.632 14 5 2 1994-2016 
San Diego Chargers CA 11.28 368 181 7.87 0.492 8 0 0 1994-2016 
San Francisco 49ers CA 11.28 368 181.5 7.89 0.493 10 2 1 1994-2016 
Seattle Seahawks WA 0.00 368 198.5 8.63 0.539 12 3 1 1994-2016 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers FL 0.00 368 169 7.35 0.459 7 1 1 1994-2016 
Tennessee Titans TN 0.00 368 179 7.78 0.486 6 1 0 1994-2016 
Washington Redskins MD 5.39 368 158 6.87 0.429 5 0 0 1994-2016 
           
Average  4.97 360.5 180.25 7.97 0.498 8.63 1.44 0.72 1994-2016 
Median  5.44 368.0 180.0 7.86 0.491 7.50 1.00 0.00 1994-2016 
Min  0.00 240.0 88.0 4.89 0.306 1.00 0.00 0.00 1994-2016 
Max  11.28 368.0 255.0 11.09 0.693 18.00 8.00 5.00 1994-2016 
  
26 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for 1994-2016; for a description of the variables, see Table 2.  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min 
25th 
perc. Median 
75th 
perc. Max Obs 
Wins 8 3.040 0 6 8 10 16 721 
Playoff 0.382 0.486 0 0 0 1 1 721 
StateTax 5.014 3.465 0 3.00 5.150 6.89 14.1 721 
TaxDiff 0.000 3.459 -5.337 -2.038 0.146 2.026 8.913 721 
QBstart 1.688 0.775 1 1 2 2 4 721 
QBexp 5.535 4.055 0 2 5 8 20 721 
CoachExp 5.463 5.225 0 1 4 8 32 721 
CoachChange 0.227 0.419 0 0 0 0 1 721 
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Table 5 – Fixed effects regression results (wins) 
Table 5 reports results of the fixed effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016. The dependent variable is wins. The 
variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 exp.  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StateTax - -0.2060* -0.2042** -0.2533**    
  (0.1022) (0.0974) (0.1190)    
TaxDiff -    -0.1975* -0.1877* -0.2372* 
     (0.1145) (0.1079) (0.1279) 
LagWins +  0.1289***   0.1290***  
   (0.0351)   (0.0353)  
5yearWins +   -0.0169   -0.0162 
    (0.0899)   (0.0906) 
QBstart - -1.2971*** -1.3591*** -1.5494*** -1.2936*** -1.3539*** -1.5429*** 
  (0.1807) (0.1873) (0.1912) (0.1799) (0.1863) (0.1901) 
QBexp + 0.0706** 0.0537* 0.0543 0.0700** 0.0532* 0.0536 
  (0.0303) (0.0307) (0.0360) (0.0305) (0.0309) (0.0365) 
CoachExp + 0.0055 -0.0020 0.0010 0.0053 -0.0021 0.0008 
  (0.0247) (0.0252) (0.0294) (0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0299) 
CoachChange - -0.8711*** -0.5589** -0.8277*** -0.8749*** -0.5629** -0.8341*** 
  (0.2446) (0.2449) (0.2878) (0.2457) (0.2455) (0.2896) 
Division ? -0.0047 -0.0022 -0.0075 -0.0021 0.0016 -0.0028 
  (0.0305) (0.0295) (0.0463) (0.0301) (0.0287) (0.0456) 
Constant  11.0348*** 10.1512*** 11.9718*** 9.9802*** 9.0957*** 10.6585*** 
  (0.7674) (0.7982) (0.9956) (0.4273) (0.5323) (0.8897) 
N  721 689 561 721 689 561 
r2  0.1407 0.1601 0.1778 0.1403 0.1594 0.1768 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 – Probit Regression (Playoff) 
Table 6 reports results of the probit regression over the period 1994-2016. The dependent variable is playoff. The variables are 
defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 exp.  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StateTax - -0.0216 -0.0230* -0.0304*    
  (0.0168) (0.0141) (0.0166)    
TaxDiff -    -0.0214 -0.0226* -0.0300* 
     (0.0168) (0.0142) (0.0165) 
LagPlayoff +  0.4751***   0.4752***  
   (0.1005)   (0.1006)  
5yearPlayoff +   0.1389***   0.1391*** 
    (0.0438)   (0.0439) 
QBstart - -0.4167*** -0.4122*** -0.4578*** -0.4163*** -0.4115*** -0.4570*** 
  (0.1000) (0.1017) (0.1103) (0.0999) (0.1016) (0.1101) 
QBexp + 0.0288** 0.0198 0.0107 0.0287** 0.0197 0.0106 
  (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0167) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0168) 
CoachExp + 0.0140 0.0140 0.0185 0.0140 0.0140 0.0185 
  (0.0132) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0113) (0.0123) 
CoachChange - -0.4186*** -0.2366* -0.3049* -0.4188*** -0.2370* -0.3054* 
  (0.1384) (0.1349) (0.1645) (0.1383) (0.1349) (0.1643) 
Division ? 0.0122 0.0094 0.0078 0.0125 0.0098 0.0084 
  (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0202) (0.0136) (0.0121) (0.0201) 
Team ? 0.0009 0.0028 0.0064 0.0008 0.0026 0.0062 
  (0.0084) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0071) (0.0085) 
Constant  0.2339 0.0452 0.0589 0.1243 -0.0717 -0.0960 
  (0.3008) (0.2776) (0.3101) (0.2680) (0.2470) (0.2730) 
N  721 689 561 721 689 561 
ll  -445.9222 -416.9122 -337.5059 -445.9533 -416.9598 -337.5575 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 – Random effects regression (wins) 
Table 7 reports results of the random effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016. The dependent variable is wins. The 
variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 exp.  
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StateTax - -0.0612* -0.0607* -0.0741**    
  (0.0364) (0.0312) (0.0366)    
TaxDiff -    -0.0600 -0.0595* -0.0728** 
     (0.0371) (0.0313) (0.0366) 
LagWins +  0.2285***   0.2286***  
   (0.0344)   (0.0344)  
5yearWins +   0.2981***   0.2987*** 
    (0.0819)   (0.0819) 
QBstart - -1.2947*** -1.2892*** -1.4477*** -1.2937*** -1.2881*** -1.4463*** 
  (0.1651) (0.1608) (0.1676) (0.1651) (0.1608) (0.1674) 
QBexp + 0.0993*** 0.0716*** 0.0550 0.0991*** 0.0714** 0.0547 
  (0.0299) (0.0277) (0.0339) (0.0300) (0.0278) (0.0341) 
CoachExp + 0.0277 0.0223 0.0306 0.0277 0.0223 0.0306 
  (0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0294) (0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0294) 
CoachChange - -1.0261*** -0.4780* -0.8395*** -1.0276*** -0.4796* -0.8413*** 
  (0.2492) (0.2563) (0.2866) (0.2496) (0.2563) (0.2867) 
Division ? 0.0098 0.0143 0.0161 0.0104 0.0151 0.0170 
  (0.0298) (0.0271) (0.0377) (0.0297) (0.0269) (0.0376) 
Constant  9.9467*** 8.1483*** 8.0626*** 9.6348*** 7.8375*** 7.6792*** 
  (0.5740) (0.5671) (0.9186) (0.4810) (0.5199) (0.8399) 
N  721 689 561 721 689 561 
r2  0.1772 0.2216 0.2496 0.1771 0.2214 0.2493 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 – Robustness Checks (StateTax) 
Table 8 reports results of the fixed effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016 for four different sub-samples: specifications (1)-(3) exclude teams that did not play throughout the whole 
observation period (expansion teams); specifications (4)-(6) exclude observations from the most successful team throughout the whole observation period (New England Patriots); specifications (7)-
(9) exclude observations from the least successful team throughout the whole observation period (Cleveland Browns); and specifications (10)-(12) exclude observations from both the most and the 
least successful team. The dependent variable is wins. The variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 exp.  
sign 
without expansion teams without best team (New England) without worst team (Cleveland) without best and worst team 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
StateTax - -0.2351** -0.2378** -0.2544* -0.1725 -0.1708* -0.2250* -0.2176** -0.2229** -0.2669** -0.1815 -0.1879* -0.2383* 
  (0.1100) (0.1030) (0.1293) (0.1029) (0.0976) (0.1225) (0.1063) (0.0997) (0.1212) (0.1070) (0.0999) (0.1245) 
LagWins +  0.1388***   0.1307***   0.1296***   0.1313***  
   (0.0387)   (0.0360)   (0.0354)   (0.0364)  
5yearWins +   0.0079   -0.0314   -0.0179   -0.0323 
    (0.0934)   (0.0925)   (0.0905)   (0.0932) 
QBstart - -1.24*** -1.31*** -1.53*** -1.32*** -1.39*** -1.59*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.1959) (0.2028) (0.2078) (0.1826) (0.1892) (0.1903) (0.0313) (0.0301) (0.0464) (0.0299) (0.0287) (0.0458) 
QBexp + 0.0736** 0.0560 0.0477 0.0647** 0.0479 0.0515 -1.2891*** -1.3465*** -1.5516*** -1.3168*** -1.3762*** -1.5984*** 
  (0.0339) (0.0341) (0.0415) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0374) (0.1856) (0.1919) (0.1956) (0.1874) (0.1938) (0.1946) 
CoachExp + -0.0071 -0.0164 -0.0134 -0.0021 -0.0102 -0.0077 0.0711** 0.0552* 0.0552 0.0650** 0.0492 0.0524 
  (0.0281) (0.0284) (0.0333) (0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0304) (0.0310) (0.0313) (0.0370) (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0384) 
Coach-
Change 
- -0.9730*** -0.6668** -1.0108*** -0.8506*** -0.5251** -0.7973** 0.0056 -0.0021 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0102 -0.0080 
 (0.2667) (0.2608) (0.3075) (0.2472) (0.2480) (0.2908) (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0294) (0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0304) 
Division ? -0.0096 -0.0100 -0.0173 0.0084 0.0105 0.0087 -0.8575*** -0.5536** -0.8205** -0.8350*** -0.5184* -0.7882** 
  (0.0343) (0.0327) (0.0506) (0.0292) (0.0281) (0.0456) (0.2542) (0.2551) (0.2987) (0.2569) (0.2586) (0.3017) 
Constant  11.27*** 10.34*** 12.03*** 10.80*** 9.92*** 11.89*** 11.10*** 10.24*** 12.08*** 10.85*** 10.01*** 12.00*** 
  (0.7931) (0.8309) (1.0411) (0.7853) (0.7966) (1.0169) (0.7880) (0.8182) (1.0090) (0.8059) (0.8151) (1.0301) 
N  634 606 494 698 667 543 703 672 548 680 650 530 
r2  0.1395 0.1649 0.1838 0.1417 0.1624 0.1846 0.1395 0.1592 0.1784 0.1406 0.1614 0.1853 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9 – Robustness Checks (TaxDiff) 
Table 9 reports results of the fixed effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016 for four different sub-samples: specifications (1)-(3) exclude teams that did not play throughout the whole 
observation period (expansion teams); specifications (4)-(6) exclude observations from the most successful team throughout the whole observation period (New England Patriots); specifications (7)-
(9) exclude observations from the least successful team throughout the whole observation period (Cleveland Browns); and specifications (10)-(12) exclude observations from both the most and the 
least successful team. The dependent variable is wins. The variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 exp.  
sign 
without expansion teams without best team (New England) without worst team (Cleveland) without best and worst team 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
TaxDiff - -0.2426* -0.2328** -0.2442* -0.1635 -0.1539 -0.2051 -0.2179* -0.2155* -0.2579* -0.1807 -0.1797 -0.2252 
  (0.1221) (0.1119) (0.1383) (0.1171) (0.1100) (0.1337) (0.1196) (0.1099) (0.1306) (0.1227) (0.1124) (0.1363) 
LagWins +  0.1385***   0.1307***   0.1295***   0.1312***  
   (0.0389)   (0.0361)   (0.0357)   (0.0365)  
5yearWins +   0.0072   -0.0305   -0.0175   -0.0314 
    (0.0943)   (0.0932)   (0.0913)   (0.0939) 
QBstart - -1.2383*** -1.3020*** -1.5250*** -1.3192*** -1.3821*** -1.5884*** -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0035 0.0130 0.0136 0.0124 
  (0.1946) (0.2015) (0.2065) (0.1817) (0.1881) (0.1891) (0.0309) (0.0293) (0.0457) (0.0295) (0.0279) (0.0451) 
QBexp + 0.0729** 0.0553 0.0469 0.0643** 0.0476 0.0512 -1.2850*** -1.3407*** -1.5445*** -1.3128*** -1.3707*** -1.5914*** 
  (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0420) (0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0378) (0.1846) (0.1908) (0.1945) (0.1864) (0.1926) (0.1934) 
CoachExp + -0.0072 -0.0164 -0.0134 -0.0021 -0.0102 -0.0077 0.0704** 0.0545* 0.0544 0.0645* 0.0488 0.0519 
  (0.0281) (0.0287) (0.0339) (0.0254) (0.0261) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0374) (0.0317) (0.0320) (0.0388) 
Coach-
Change 
- -0.9740*** -0.6702** -1.0161*** -0.8536*** -0.5280** -0.8022** 0.0055 -0.0022 0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0101 -0.0079 
 (0.2701) (0.2624) (0.3098) (0.2480) (0.2483) (0.2924) (0.0248) (0.0254) (0.0298) (0.0254) (0.0260) (0.0310) 
Division ? -0.0070 -0.0058 -0.0129 0.0106 0.0139 0.0132 -0.8600*** -0.5568** -0.8254** -0.8366*** -0.5208* -0.7918** 
  (0.0337) (0.0317) (0.0499) (0.0288) (0.0273) (0.0450) (0.2558) (0.2560) (0.3009) (0.2582) (0.2593) (0.3039) 
Constant  10.0596*** 9.1196*** 10.7194*** 9.9184*** 9.0398*** 10.7148*** 9.9832*** 9.0918*** 10.7025*** 9.9207*** 9.0357*** 10.7570*** 
  (0.4615) (0.5886) (0.9524) (0.4391) (0.5364) (0.9012) (0.4322) (0.5395) (0.9001) (0.4443) (0.5439) (0.9119) 
N  634 606 494 698 667 543 703 672 548 680 650 530 
r2  0.1394 0.1645 0.1830 0.1413 0.1618 0.1836 0.1393 0.1587 0.1776 0.1404 0.1610 0.1844 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10 – Robustness Check – Without teams in states with no personal income tax 
Table 10 reports results of the fixed effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016 for a sub-sample excluding teams that 
are located in states that do not apply a personal income tax (Florida, Tennessee, Texas, Washington = total of seven teams and 
152 team-year observations). The dependent variable is wins. The variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** 
and ***, respectively. 
 exp.  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StateTax - -0.2362** -0.2385** -0.2888**    
  (0.1004) (0.0955) (0.1204)    
TaxDiff -    -0.2540** -0.2447** -0.3119** 
     (0.1060) (0.1012) (0.1249) 
LagWins +  0.1260***   0.1254***  
   (0.0397)   (0.0399)  
5yearWins +   -0.0742   -0.0772 
    (0.1046)   (0.1054) 
QBstart - -1.3915*** -1.4557*** -1.5905*** -1.3886*** -1.4515*** -1.5858*** 
  (0.1669) (0.1753) (0.1920) (0.1656) (0.1739) (0.1900) 
QBexp + 0.0627* 0.0473 0.0541 0.0610* 0.0459 0.0520 
  (0.0354) (0.0362) (0.0390) (0.0355) (0.0364) (0.0391) 
CoachExp + 0.0088 0.0030 -0.0006 0.0085 0.0025 -0.0015 
  (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0326) (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0325) 
CoachChange - -0.6763** -0.3775 -0.6958** -0.6782** -0.3832 -0.7020** 
  (0.2443) (0.2775) (0.3232) (0.2440) (0.2777) (0.3233) 
Division ? -0.0319 -0.0299 -0.0467 -0.0297 -0.0261 -0.0431 
  (0.0337) (0.0324) (0.0515) (0.0331) (0.0315) (0.0507) 
Constant  11.8565*** 10.9863*** 13.2874*** 10.6843*** 9.7817*** 11.8778*** 
  (0.8902) (0.8925) (1.1930) (0.4891) (0.5618) (0.9968) 
N  569 544 444 569 544 444 
r2  0.1494 0.1703 0.1814 0.1497 0.1701 0.1820 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
33 
 
Table 11 – Robustness Check – Without Quarterbacks 
Table 11 reports results of the fixed effects panel regression over the period 1994-2016. The variables controlling for the 
position of Quarterback are excluded. The dependent variable is wins. The variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; year fixed-effects are included. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 exp.  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StateTax - -0.1829* -0.1647* -0.2324*    
  (0.1049) (0.0943) (0.1166)    
TaxDiff -    -0.1968* -0.1771* -0.2500* 
     (0.1223) (0.1106) (0.1308) 
LagWins +  0.1397***   0.1394***  
   (0.0363)   (0.0365)  
5yearWins +   0.0161   0.0157 
    (0.0723)   (0.0729) 
CoachExp + 0.0174 0.0061 0.0065 0.0171 0.0060 0.0064 
  (0.0290) (0.0283) (0.0370) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.0369) 
CoachChange - -0.9558*** -0.6005** -0.9157*** -0.9586*** -0.6042** -0.9196*** 
  (0.2530) (0.2579) (0.3155) (0.2539) (0.2578) (0.3159) 
Division ? -0.0123 -0.0085 -0.0176 -0.0105 -0.0058 -0.0142 
  (0.0364) (0.0353) (0.0532) (0.0361) (0.0347) (0.0527) 
Constant  9.1321*** 7.8909*** 9.3597*** 8.2014*** 7.0511*** 8.1740*** 
  (0.6936) (0.7449) (0.9890) (0.3338) (0.4853) (0.8043) 
N  721 689 561 721 689 561 
r2  0.0261 0.0390 0.0248 0.0263 0.0392 0.0252 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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